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HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NINTH
AMENDMENT: A NEW FORM
OF GUARANTEE
Jordon J. Paustt
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal;
that they are endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable Rights;
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 1776
Even those who are aware only of the two instances of substan-
tial and violent human rights deprivation which occurred in Bang-
ladesh a few years ago and in much of Nazi-controlled Europe
over a quarter of a century ago should readily recognize the
intense interdependency that exists between peace and the effec-
tive realization of fundamental human values. Such a recognition
has been made by the United Nations,' and the United Nations
Charter contains a related pledge of the United States and all other
member nations to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the UN for the effective implementation of a "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all."' 2 Not only has it been recognized that human
rights and peace are interdependent, but many observers have also
noted an increasing interdependency among all people which
should form the basis for a cooperative concern for the rights of
others.3 Thomas Paine expressed this same principle of inter-
dependence when he declared that "[h]e that would make his own
liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if
he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to
t J.S.D. Candidate, Yale University; Associate Professor, University of Houston;
Member American Society of International Law; Secretary on International Law, ABA
Committee on Human Rights. A.B. 1965, J.D. 1968, University of California at Los Angeles;
LL.M. 1972, University of Virginia.
I See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
2 U.N. CHARTER arts. 55(c), 56. See also U.N. CHARTER preamble, art. 1(3). Of course,
this pledge of the United States binds it to action under international law. See, e.g., Paust &
Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 415
passim (1974).
3 See, e.g., McDougal, Human Rights and World Public Order: Principles of Content and
Procedures for Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 VA. J. iNT'L L. 387 (1974); Paust &
Blaustein, supra note 2; Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Reply and Reaffirmation, 69
AM. J. INT'L L. - (1975); Reisman, Responses to Crimes of Discrimination and Genocide: An
Appraisal of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1 DEN. J. INT'L & POL. 29
(1971).
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himself. '4 Indeed, by failing to effectuate the basic human rights of
all members of our society, we lay the ground work for a depriva-
tion which can eventually destroy the very human values that we
claim to cherish.
Such recognition of the basic interdependence of human
rights is of great importance to international lawyers, 5 but it is also
vital to those concerned with the guarantee of civil liberties, the
curtailment of impermissible violence, and, hence, the continuation
of a viable democracy in America. A proper and comprehensive
inquiry into these concerns should cause one to ask whether there
are shared and interdependent policies (goal-values) and expecta-
tions that have been documented over the years. Such docu-
mentation can be found in the Constitution, the writings of the
early leaders of this country, the outcomes of a dynamic
judicial process--"case law"--and the international human rights
6instruments, among others. 7 One should ask whether there are
substantive and procedural guarantees in United States law for the
universal respect and observance of such fundamental human
values. It is necessary to discover how and where each of these
shared values has actually been implemented in the social process;
for if basic human values have not been guaranteed to each
member of our society, then all of us remain in an uncertain peace
and possess tenuous liberties.8
4 2 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 588 (P. Foner ed. 1945).
This importance is generally acknowledged by the community of international
lawyers.
6 Relevant human rights instruments include: U.N. CHARTER, preamble, arts. 1(3),
55(c), 56 (1945); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71 (1948) [hereinafter cited as UNIVERSAL DECLARATION]; 1949 Geneva Conventions, [1949]
6 U.S.T. 3516, T.1.A.S. No. 3365; 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (adoption by vote of
106-0-0; not yet ratified by United States).
See, e.g., McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitutional
Illusions Versus RationalAction, 59 YALE L.J. 60, 110-15 (1949). The authors express the view
that there is necessarily an interdependency between universally shared values and our
national values, and that the same forces and considerations apply to national values so as to
make international rights "of nation-wide concern for our people" and any free society. For
similar views of interdependency and the nature of "intergroup" expectations, see Reisman,
supra note 3, at 30-36, 39-40. For discussion of the utility of treaties, executive acts, legislative
acts, judicial decisions, the practice of peoples, and the works of jurists and scholars in
ascertaining and applying international law in "questions of right," see The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The same approach was used by the British prior to the
American Revolution. See Triquet v. Bath, 96 Eng. Rep. 273 (K.B. 1764) (before Lord
Mansfield). See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942); Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas.
1099, 1107-08, 1120 n.6 (No. 6360) (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
8 The first codified law of European-Americans, the Connecticut Constitution of 1638,
entered into and adopted by the towns of Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield Connecticut,
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Some people have sought to secure a continuance of our
inherited civil liberties and to guarantee the internationally recog-
nized rights of man by arguing that the international law of human
rights has become part of our law through the ratification of the
United Nations Charter. :' This attempt to bring internationally
recognized human rights into our domestic legal process as treaty
law and, thus, part of the "supreme" law of the land through
Article VI of the United States Constitution, has not succeeded. 10
stated that "to meinteine the peace and union of such a people, there should bee an orderly
and decent governement . . ." and that "the free fruition of such libberties, immunities,
priviledges, as humanity, civility and Christianity call for, as due to every man in his place
and proportion, without impeachment and infringement, hath ever beene and ever will bee
the tranquillity and stabillity of Churches and Commonwealths; and the denyall or deprivall
thereof, the disturbance, if not ruine of both." See THE CODE OF 1650: BEING A COMPILATION
OF THE EARLIEST LAWS AND ORDERS OF THE GENERAL COURT OF CONNECTICUT 11, 18 (S.
Andrews ed. 1822). See also M. McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 338, passim
(1960); McDougal & Bebr, Human Rights in the United Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 603, 606-07,
612 (1964); Solzhenitsyn, Peace and Violence, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1973, § 1, at 31, col. 2.
See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. California, 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. App. 1950), rev'd, 38 Cal. 2d 718,
242 P.2d 617 (1952). Contra, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 673 (1948) (Murphy &
Rutledge, JJ., concurring); Hudson, Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law, 44
AM. J. INT'L L. 543 (1950); Wright, Conflicts of International Law with National Laws and
Ordinances, 11 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1917); Wright, National Courts and Human Rights-The Fujii
Case, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1951). See also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1948)
(Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 604, 204 P.2d 569, 579
(1949); P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 91 (1952); Bitker, The Constitutionality of
International Agreements on Human Rights, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 279 (1972); Henkin, The
Constitution, Treaties, and International Human Rights, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1012 (1968);
McDougal & Leighton, supra note 7; Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War Crime Jurisdiction
Over Civilians in Federal District Courts, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 6 (1971); Sayre, Shelley v. Kraemer
and United Nations Law, 34 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1948); Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of
International Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1932); note
93 infra.
10 Actually, the UN Charter obligations are part of treaty law, and, by virtue of article
VI of the Constitution, part of the "supreme law" of the land. Moreover, any statute that is
inconsistent with human rights, as guaranteed under the UN Charter, should be struck
down by the courts as unconstitutional. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 673 (1948)
(Murphy & Rutledge, JJ., concurring). See also id. at 649-50 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concur-
ring); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 604, 204 P.2d 569, 579 (1949). But since the highly
controversial reversal of the Sei Fujii case by the California Supreme Court in an era of
notable racial hysteria, other courts have been reluctant to apply human rights principles to
questions of rights under federal or state law. This has been true despite the Supreme
Court's statement that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The usual doctrinal ploy given by courts that refuse to apply
international human rights norms to questions of right as often as they come up is that the
content of human rights obligations contained in our treaty law is too difficult for the court to
discover and the treaty law obligations are not "self-executing," or are of no legal effect
absent some specific implementing governmental legislation. See Vfissidis v. Anadell, 262
F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1959); Camacho v. Rogers, 199 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Pauling v.
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Nevertheless, human rights activists still seem intent on continuing
the quest for an Article VI form of guarantee, instead of exploring
the several other bases for human value recognition and
implementation.11 It is the purpose of this Article, however, to
focus on an alternative form of guarantee and to analyze the
problems which have impaired its utility in the past. Hopefully, this
focus will contribute to an ongoing and efficacious examination of
what otherwise would have to be considered a tautology-that
human rights must necessarily be our own rights, because we are
human beings.
I
A NEW FORM OF GUARANTEE
A. The Ninth Amendment
The new form of human value guarantee considered here is
not really new at all. It has suffered, however, from a lack of
juridical use and from several misconceptions as to its nature and
purpose. The alternative basis for the protection of fundamental
human values is the ninth amendment-one of the shortest, but
perhaps one of the most important, declarations in the United
States Constitution. It states that "[t]he enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." Its utility lies not in
asking how internationally recognized rights can be "implemented"
into our domestic law through new legislative acts, but in recogniz-
ing that basic human rights are already a viable part of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of Americans. Perhaps it is true
that our courts either have not recognized the existence of such a
constitutional protection or have been unwilling to use it because
they fear criticism for expounding arbitrary and personal social
preferences. 12 It is apparent, however, that our Forefathers
McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958), aff'd, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Sei Fujii v.
California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). See also United States v. Vargas, 370 F.
Supp. 908, 915 (D.P.R. 1974). Thus, governments that do not legislate do not fearjudicial or
legislative restraint unless a particular right is also documented in the Constitution.
I The usual attempt is to seek United States ratification of human rights agreements
and to obtain desirable implementing legislation thereafter. See, e.g., Hearings on the
Treatymaking Power of the United States in Human Rights Matters Before the Subcomm. on
International Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., Appendix 18, at 731 (1974).
12 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-12, 519-25 (1965) (Black, J.,
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definitely expected that the rights of man would be guaranteed
under the ninth amendment. 13 It also appears that we can recap-
ture this intended utility of the ninth amendment, since a more
broadly documented enumeration of the rights of man is now
available for judicial discovery and use:
To the extent that the general boundaries and criteria neces-
sary to discover the content of each type of right become
identifiable in different arenas of the legal process, they should be
used by the courts to effectuate shared expectations of "right" and
should not simply be ignored. Indeed, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence expressed to the world the expectation that all govern-
mental bodies-and thus the members of the judiciary-were to
function so as "to secure these rights" which are fundamental to all.
The judiciary must recognize that its action or inaction will directly
affect the realization of fundamental human expectations. Human
rights policies are at stake in every form of human interaction and
are relevant to every instance of authoritative decision. The
judiciary cannot avoid its responsibility for rational and policy-
serving decision by simplistic notions of noninvolvement, nor can it
continue to ignore several rights of man with an egregious and
self-deceiving claim of unfamiliarity with fundamental and con-
tinuous expectations that, as it happened, were not specifically
listed some 200 years ago.1 4 Indeed, rational and policy-serving
judicial decision-making can only occur where the effort is made to
enrich decisional awareness of, and responsiveness to, policy and
context, through a systematic exploration of all of the policies at
stake and all of the relevant features of context which will condi-
tion the effects of decision and the serving of legal policy in social
process.
dissenting); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv.
787, 790 (1962).
'3 See E. CORWIN, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION 3-5, 132 (4th ed. 1967); H.
LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950). See also Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 320 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring) (referring to Patrick Henry's concern for
guarantee of "human rights").
'4 An example of this stated unfamiliarity is the expression of Justice Jackson that the
ninth amendment rights "are still a mystery to me." R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 75 (1955). Compare Jackson's jurisprudential outlook
with that of Thomas Jefferson, as etched over the entrance to a hall at the University of
Virginia Law School: "That those alone may be servants of the law who labor with learning,
courage and devotion to preserve liberty and promote justice." Neither liberty nor justice
can function under the limitations of specific enumeration. See also Corwin, The "Higher Law"
Background of American Constitutional Law (pts. 1-2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365, 409 n.137
(1928-29).
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B. The Need for a More Comprehensive Focus
In a sense, part of the failure of our adjudicatory process to
guarantee a full range of fundamental human values to all persons
in our society stems from a simplistic and formalistic jurispruden-
tial inheritance of the nineteenth century that can be generalized as
"legal positivism.' 15 Legal positivism replaced the naturalist school
of thought which was dominant at the time of the American
Revolution and the signing of our Constitution, and thus was not
the philosophical world-view or approach to legal thinking that the
Framers of the Constitution would have held in common.
In practice, legal positivism is actually a form of legal
negativism, since it demands of its adherents a simple, myopic, and
inhibiting reference to the words of enacted law. It ignores the
entirety of legal process and a comprehensive orientation in social
process, which are far more rational, relevant, and responsive to
the whole range of policies, needs, and shared expectations which
stand behind a set of printed words.' 6 It is not the purpose of this
Article to expand upon the evils of formalistic, unresponsive legal
thinking. Jurisprudential perspectives would not even be men-
tioned here except for the fact that they underlie each lawyer's
conception of the juridical utility of a now dormant ninth amend-
ment. They underlie as well the court's conception of its role in the
implementation of the law, the securing of fundamental rights, and
the discovery of a shared content for these rights. Thus, in a very
real sense, a second form of guarantee that is interconnected with
the utility of the ninth amendment would stem from a broader
jurisprudential focus-a focus which, as it turns out, is more
compatible with that of the Framers than that of the legal
positivists.
With a comprehensive perspective, the courts could more
easily and more rationally discover the content of rights which are
not specifically enumerated in the Constitution but which are,
nevertheless, rooted in the expectations of the people and in
documented policy. A court which uses these sorts of indicia of
"rights" content would not be acting arbitrarily, deferring to trans-
cendental sources, or expounding a personal social preference. On
15 Noted positivists include Austin, Hart, Kelsen and Justice Black. See note 16 infra.
16 For a discussion of these and other inadequacies of legal positivism see, for example,
Lasswell & McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. GAL. L. REv. 362 (1971); Moore,
Prolegomenou to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. Rv. 662
(1968); Paust, The Concept of Norm: A Consideratiou of the Jurisprudential Views of Hart, Kelsen
and McDougal and Paust, An International Structure for Implementation of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions: Needs and Function Analysis, in 1 YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1974).
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the contrary, it would be rationally implementing social demands
and expectations which are generally shared and which are empiri-
cally discernible. To do less will only be less rational and involve a
decisional effort that is less responsive to overall legal policy and
human needs. A court which sought to be more comprehensive
would be performing the constituted function which is primary to
any governmental entity--the securing of rights which the people
expect. Furthermore, such a court can recapture the broader
jurisprudential perspective thought necessary by the Framers of
the Constitution, without resorting to the evils of a naturalist
school-e.g., ad hocery, autonomous concepts, personal viewpoints,
arbitrary decision-making, and so forth 17-or a newer and more
egregious form of sensualist jurisprudence-the "I know it when I
feel it" school. In a sentence, the courts can use a wider juristic
focus to regain the original constitutional construct and to utilize
international human rights as an interpretive aid for a proper
application of the ninth amendment and the universal implementa-
tion of human rights as called for by the United Nations Charter.
II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
It seems clear from the language of the ninth amendment that
certain rights exist even though they are not enumerated in the
Constitution, that these rights are retained by the people, and that
by express command these unenumerated rights are not to be
denied or disparaged by any governmental body.18 It is also a
generally accepted truism that "[i]t cannot be presumed that any
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect."1 9
The only problem, then, would appear to be how to develop some
useful, rational, and policy-serving methodology for the discovery
of the actual content of these rights. But no matter how clear these
tenets seem to be, there are those who would confuse the role of
17 See sources cited note 16 supra.
Is See Corwin, supra note 14; Hamlin, The Bill of Rights or the First Ten Amendments to the
United States Constitution, 68 COM. L.J. 233, 235-36 (1963); Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, 11 1ND. L.J. 309 (1936); Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF. L. REv.
787 (1959).
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (Marshall, C.J., for the
Court). The ninth must be a part of the "scheme of ordered liherty." Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); see Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). Justice
Frankfurter stated that, "[a]s no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so none should
suffer subordination or deletion." Id at 428. For further discussion of this matter, see cases
cited in Kelsey, supra note 18, at 312 n.34.
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the ninth amendment in the scheme developed for the constitu-
tional protection of human values and liberties.
The several obfuscating misconceptions that exist in the com-
mentary are generally classifiable into four main arguments:
(1) The ninth is a mere "policy" statement.
(2) The ninth merely cuts back on the grant of "power" to the
federal government.
(3) The ninth is merely a "rule of construction."
(4) The ninth is no longer needed in view of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.
A. The Mere Statement of Policy Argument
The main difficulty with the first view, that the ninth amend-
ment is a mere "statement of policy" and not a constitutional
guarantee of unenumerated rights, .0 is that whether one calls it a
"policy" or a protective amendment, the intent still seems clearly
expressed. That intent was specified in the language which states
that certain unenumerated rights exist and which demands that
these rights shall not, under any circumstances, be denied or
disparaged.2' A court that did not seek comprehensive- awareness
and application of human rights policies would, in effect, be
denying their existence or relevance and disparaging their
efficacious role in social process. And clearly this, by command of
the Constitution, is what a court must not do. The very fact that
there are human rights "policies" makes it necessary to serve these
policies through an integrative decisional effort.
B. The Restriction on Federal Power Argument
A second misconception, which also ignores the plain wording
of the amendment, is that the ninth was established merely as a
cut-back on the grant of power to the federal government and was
not established to guarantee rights against denial or dis-
paragement.22 Two possible positions can derive from this mis-
20 See generally 2 J. STORY ON THE CONSTITUTION 651 (5th ed. 1891); Redlich,
supra note 12; Note, The Ninth Amendment: Guidepost to Fundamental Rights, 8 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 101 (1966).
21 See Dunbar,James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627, 628 (1956).
The author points out that even if the ninth is only "declaratory" it must "declare something."
Id. (emphasis added).
22 Justice Black has stated that the purpose of the ninth amendment was merely to
"emphasize the limited nature of the Federal Government." Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U.L. REv. 865, 871 (1960). He repeated his assertions in his dissent in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 519-20 (1965), but apparently ignored his 1960 statement that
the use of the words "the people" in the ninth and tenth amendments "strongly emphasizes
[Vol. 60:231
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conception. The first, which seems to pose the most dangerous
threat to inherited goal-values today, would affirm that the un-
enumerated rights are the equivalent of a constitutional scheme
which grants and withholds federal powers. The second derivation
would affirm that unenumerated rights do exist, but that they are
only "rights" against the power of the federal government and are
not inherent rights of man which exist against the state govern-
ments or the conduct of other men outside of government. For
convenience, these two positions will be referred to as the "con-
stitutional scheme approach" and the "non-inherent rights ap-
proach," respectively.
1. The "Constitutional Scheme Approach"
Under the "constitutional scheme approach," the "rights" that
are retained are equivalent to the remaining "powers"-i.e., those
not granted to the federal government-which, in the abstract, are
few indeed. And, the adherents to this misconception would argue,
there are no rights except those which relate to the governmental
process, so the whole knotty question of the difference between
rights and powers simply disappears.
This approach reveals an underlying dependence upon an
unquestioned assumption that where the federal government pos-
sesses a "power" it is held in the absolute-that the interests of the
government are to prevail whenever they are balanced against
individual interests, whether the individual efforts are joint or
separate.2 3 It is not an assumption which is easily perceived, espe-
cially when the misconceivers blur the distinctions between "power"
and "rights"; but if one seeks to explore the imposed construct of
"power" and "right" a bit further, one runs ultimately into an
overall question of authority, since none of the adherents openly
proclaims that the holders of governmental positions can govern
the rest of us, and presumably themselves, with raw power. Each
identifiable adherent is concerned with granted or authorized
power, that is, delegated authority. They are not really concerned
with "rights," but seek to identify a retained authority of the
the desire of the Framers to protect individual liberty." Black, supra at 871 .Justices Goldberg
and Brennan specifically disagreed with Justice Black's views on the purpose of the ninth.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-93 (concurring opinion).
23 This conclusion was expressed by Justice Reed in United Public Workers of America
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947). It has been criticized, however, as "an unfounded basis
for the dominance of the central government." See Ringold, The History of the Enactment of the
Ninth Amendment and Its Recent Development, 8 TULSA L.J. 1, 13 (1972) and references
cited therein.
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people. They assume, rather simply, that when some authority for
a particular governmental function has been delegated, then
that is the end of the question. Nothing needs to be balanced since,
it is assumed, authority was given up-i.e., not conditionally
granted or mutually held. Any authority that was not given up is
what the ninth amendment refers to, not some notion of "right"
outside of a hierarchy of governmental and nongovernmental
"power." But if there had been no difference between retained
rights and retained powers, there would have been no need for the
ninth amendment at all, since the tenth amendment had already
recognized a retained power in the people.24 Furthermore, this
sort of misconception hinges upon a dangerous blurring of the
distinction between delegated competence to make authoritative
decisions-i.e., power-and the legalpolicies which are at stake-i.e.,
shared policies or expectations of the existence of "rights" and
"duties." Contrary to this interpretation of the ninth amendment,
competence is not at all the same as "right"; and a delegated power
of decision is not the same as a set of policies which should guide
rational decision.
To put it bluntly, this misconception opens the door to a false,
totalitarian, and subversive concept of authority-i.e., that author-
ity exists with the government and not with the people.2 5 It may be
difficult for some to accept in this age of the super-industrialized
or "machine" society an increasing deference to conformity and
power, and the lessening value of the individual-if not an outright
rejection of the value of certain persons and ideas as "marginal" or
superfluous2 6-but the Framers of our own Constitution rejected
24 See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
25 This misconception has allowed the growth of totalitarianism and "machine" oriented
societies in several nations of divergent ideological background. See generally H. ARENDT,
TOTALITARIANISM (1968); G. TUNKIN, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 32, 164, 167 (G.
Ivanor-Mumiev transl. 1969) (adopting view of Engels and nineteenth century positivists
that authority comes from "will of the state" and "will of [the] ruling class"). See also E.
CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 1-9, 11-12 passim (1948); H. LAUTERPACHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HuMAN RIGHTS 75-97 passim (reprint 1968); H. MARCUSE,
SOVIET-MARXISM-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1961); Paust, The Nuclear Decision in World War
II-Truman's Ending and Avoidance of War, 8 INT'L LAW. 160, 182 n.91 (1974). This false
concept of authority has a background in the rise of industrialization, nation-state power,
and legal positivism in the nineteenth century. See sources cited in this note and note 18
supra. Professor McDougal's challenging alternative, a theory of law appropriate to a free
society, seems aptly expressed by the title of an earlier work:Jurisprudence for a Free Society, I
GA. L. REv. 1 (1966).
26 See H. MARCUSE, supra note 25; N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1974, § 1, at 34, col. 1, 4; id.
Oct. 3, 1974, § 1, at 2, col. 4; id. Sept. 27, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 6; id. Sept. 15, 1974, § 4, at 4,
col. 3. See also T. GuRR, WHY MEN REBEL 46-50, 63passim (1970); S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO
AuTHORrY (1974) (unfortunately equating authority with power).
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the view that authority comes from the government. The believed
that all authority is derived from the people and that primary
authority, which remains in the people, is at all times superior to
representative authority.2 7 How unnatural it would have been to
even suggest that a sovereign king or a president was beyond the
law, that he could protect himself, or any violator of criminal law,
from punishment by arbitrary methods or by the mere referral to
the nature and power of an office, or that he could obstruct the
administration of justice and the due process of government at his
own discretion.2
Indeed, in the Declaration of Independence these very sorts of
attempts to usurp authority or to obstruct what was considered to
be the proper functioning of the criminal process were specified in
charges against the King of England. And it was not accidental that
the King was denounced, for this and similar conduct, as a "tyrant"
and as "unfit to be the ruler of a free People. '29 With these charges
in mind, those who formulated the Declaration of Independence
expressly declared that governments are constituted in order "to
secure" the inalienable Rights of Man, that governments derive
"their just powers from the consent of the governed," and that "it
is the right of the people to alter or abolish" any form of govern-
ment which "becomes destructive of these ends."3
The preamble of the Constitution declares that "WE, the
people . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution." It does not
say "we the states," "we the super magnanimous elite," or "we the
sycophantish bureaucracy." It is no mishappenstance that the tenth
amendment expressly refers to the retained power of the people, as
well as that of the states, and the ninth amendment expressly refers
to the retained rights of the people.3' In fact, Thomas Paine, in a
27 By "representative" authority, the author means the delegated and authoritative
competence to make decisions that is conditionally granted by the people to the legislative,
the executive, and the judicial branches of the government. See Paust, supra note 16.
28 The need for legislative consent has been expressly declared throughout the constitu-
tions and resolves of this country, its states, and early English law. See DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE (1776); DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING Up ARMS
(1775); DECLARATION AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1774); ENGLISH
BILL OF RIGHTS (1689); DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 7 (1776); MD. CONST. § 7 (1776);
MASS. CONST. art. 20 (1780); PA. CONST. & DECLARATION OF RIGHTS (1790); VA. CONST. § 7
(1776). These documents have all been reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES (R. Perry &
J. Cooper eds. 1972).
29 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776).
30 Id.; see DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ 1, 4, 5 (1776); MD. CONST. §§ 1, 2, 4 (1776);
MASS. CONST. preamble, pt. I, arts. 1, 4, 5, 7 (1780); N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 1, 2, 7, 8, 10
(1784); N.C. CONST. §§ 1, 2 (1776); PA. CONST. §§ 4, 5 (1776); VA. CONST. § 3 (1776).
31 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX, X; DEL. DECLARATiON OF RIGHTS § 5 (1776); MD. CONST.
§ 4 (1776); MASS. CONST. preamble, pt. I, arts. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 (1780); N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts 1,
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widely circulated book, The Rights of Man, exposed the basis of the
distinction and the inherited expectations of our Forefathers when
he wrote that the "authority of the people" is "the only authority
on which government has a right to exist in any country. '32 Paine
emphasized that the "end of all political association is the preserva-
tion of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man.. ." and that
the government "has of itself no rights: they are altogether
duties." 33
How jarringly inappropriate would have been the argument,
then, that when the executive had decided that a particular crimi-
nal investigation or prosectution should not continue because it was
claimed to be contrary to "governmental interests," a court could
not at all interfere and a people should not complain. In fact, the
expectation of the contemporary framers of state constitutions was
clear: if any laws were to be suspended or their execution curtailed,
it was to be the legislative branch and not the executive which
would make such a decision. Moreover, the decision to suspend
investigation, prosecution, or execution of the law is not at all
synonymous with the competence to grant a pardon after
conviction.3 4 Further, to equate "govern.mental interests" with the
consent of the governed, the interests of the people, the objective
and just administration of the criminal law, or the constituted and
independent judicial power of the courts would have been not only
unacceptable but also unthinkable.
Recently, however, claims were openly made that in the sphere
2, 7, 8, 10 (1784); N.C. CONST. § 1 (1776); PA. CONST. §§ 1, 5, 6 (1776); VA. CONST. §§ 1, 2
(1776); VT. CONST. preamle, §§ 1, 5, 6, 7 (1777). A reading of these state constitution
provisions discloses that the thought of that period distinguished between "inherent rights"
belonging to every person, which cannot he divested, and the primary "power" of the
people, which can he exercised in "trust" by governmental representatives for the common
benefit, protection, and security of the whole community. Moreover, it should be noted, in
the eighteenth century it was customary to attach great importance to preambles as
declarations of general goal values sought by the relevant community.
32 See T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN Pt. 1, at 8 (1794).
33 Id. pt. 1, at 122, pt. 11, at 30; see D. MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 158
(1951) [hereinafter cited as MALONE]. Malone quotes Jefferson's remark that the "opinion of
the people" is the "basis of our governments" as a reason why Jefferson felt that the
authority of a constitution and law must be dynamic and reflect currently shared expecta-
tions. See note 62 infra.
34 See DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 7 (1776); MD. CONST. dedaration of rights, § 7
(1776); MASS. CONsT. pt. 1, art. 20 (1780); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 29 (1784); N.C. CONST.
declaration of rights, § 5 (1776); VA. CONST. bill of rights, § 7 (1776). Section 2 of artide 11
of the United States Constitution allows the President to pardon offenses against the United
States, but "he cannot exempt anyone from the law" or, it seems, the reach of the judicial
process, except by pardon. See E. CORWIN, supra note 13. Concerning the controversial
pardon of Mr. Nixon, see N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1974, at 1, col. 4.
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of delegated powers, or conditionally granted authority, the "gov-
ernmental interests" are the same as or superior to the interests of
the people, and that it is only by protecting "governmental in-
terests" that we best serve the nation.35 To this sort of claim, the
drafters of nearly all of the state constitutions that had been
written prior to the enactment of the United States Constitution
aptly expressed the following reply:
[G]overnment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common
benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or com-
munity; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of
any single man, family, or sett of men, who are a part only of
that community; And that the community hath an indubitable,
unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish
government in such manner as shall be by that community
judged most conducive to the public weal.3 6
Supplementing this declaration was the widely shared expectation
that when government is administered for the benefit of "those
who are employed in the legislative and executive business ... the
people have a right ... to reduce their public officers to a private
" This argument was made by former President Nixon's lawyers in the dispute with
then special prosecutor Archibald Cox over the surrender of Watergate-related tapes. See
N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1973, § 1, at 13, col. 1. The President's brief also stated that it "is not
true" that the "authority of the grand jury is derived from the people themselves," as the
Cox brief declared. Id. As stated in this Article, the contrary understanding prevailed nearly
200 years ago, when it was declared that all governmental authority is derived from the
people and that all governmental functioning-not only that of the grand jury, the public
prosecutor, the courts, and the legislature, but also that of the President-must be in the
people's interest and must be accounted for to them. Moreover, to allege that a compromise
between the consent of the people and the will of one branch of the government is necessary
in order to avoid "constitutional crises" is not only a self-serving justification for unilateral
control, but an affront to our inherited values and a mockery of authority and constitutional
order. Happily, the Supreme Court seems to have partially rejected most of these types of
claims in the context of Richard Nixon's confrontation with the courts, the Congress, and
the American people. See United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974) (unanimous opinion,
Rehnquist, J., not participating); N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1974, § 1, at 11, col. 1 (House
Judiciary Committee's Articles of Impeachment); id., Aug. 4, 1974, § 4, at E2, col. 3. Even
more alarming than the attempt to juxtapose "governmental" interests with the common
interests of the people were Mr. Nixon's attempts to stop the Watergate investigation and
prosecution by the Department of Justice in April 1973, because it would be "dangerous to
the Presidency." Hersh, Nixon Warned the Justice Department Against Inquiry On His Watergate
Role, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1974, at 1, col. 5.
" PA. CONST. declaration of rights § 5 (1776). Other state constitutions have similar
provisions. See, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ 1, 5 (1776); MD. CONST. declaration of
rights, § 4 (1776); MAsS. CONST. preamble, pt. 1, art. 7 (1780); N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, arts. 1, 8,
10 (1784); VT. CONST. ch. 1, §§ 5, 6, 7 (1777); VA. CONST. bill of rights, § 3 (1776). See also
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776); DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF
TAKING Up ARms (1775); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (Presidential emolument); N.C. CONST. §§ 1,
3 (1776); N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1974, § 1, at 30, col. 8 (letter to the editors).
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station, and supply the vacancies by certain and regular
elections. '37 Thomas Paine had expressed the contemporary view
on reformation of the federal government, while also recognizing
the right of removal from office. He declared that "It]he right of
reform is in the nation in its original character, and the constitu-
tional method would be by a general convention elected for the
purpose. There is moreover paradox in the idea of vitiated bodies
reforming themselves." 38 No man or group of men was to be above
the law. Public interests were to be the measure of public decisions,
and authority (just power) was to be derived from and ultimately
retained by the people. As Hamilton expressed so well: "[T]he
people surrender nothing."3'
This not only meant that delegated, or representative, author-
ity was subject to the ultimate authority of the people, but that
delegated authority was subject to retained "rights," including
evolving expectations of rights involving all social interactions, and
to a retained "power"i-.e., a competence to act, or an authority of
the people to restrict, alter, or abolish governmental institutions. In
sharp contrast, the exponents of the second misconception-that
the ninth merely cut back on federal powers-affirm that the
people have surrendered their rights. They seem to place primary
reliance upon a statement by Madison that "if a line can be drawn
between the powers granted and the rights retained, it would seem
to be the same thing.''40 Thus, they conclude, there are no "rights,"
and Madison was only concerned with the reduction of federal
power, not with the protection and implementation of rights which
were not specifically enumerated elsewhere. To reiterate, this ap-
proach necessarily ignores the language of the ninth amendment
or would, at least, affirm that the ninth amendment contains
language without meaning.
Retained powers and the efficacious protection of rights may
have seemed synonymous in the eighteenth century, but this view
37 PA. CONST. declaration of rights § 6 (1776).
38 T. PAINE, supra note 32, pt. I, at 44. A current statement of a related interest has
been made by ABA President Chesterfield Smith that "it would be improper for an
investigation of the President himself, of the office of the President, or of the executive
branch of the Federal Government to be conducted by a prosecutor subject to the direction
and control of the President." See Smith, The Constitutional Crisis, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1973,
§ 1, at 47, col. 2. Cf. MALONE 158, quoting 4 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 359 (P. Ford ed.
1899). Jefferson believed that "[t]he people are the only censors of their governors .
39 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 578 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
40 Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 814, 822
n.36 (1966), quoting 5 WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 431-32 (G. Hunt. ed. 1904); see id. at 825
n.47.
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does not similarly compel us to leave to "nature" the protection of
those same or other unenumerated rights in the twentieth century.
The better view seems to be that Madison was interested in both
rights and powers, but had thought that the rights of man were
already adequately guaranteed, both by what had been specified
and by the natural limits on federal power in the context of the
preindustrial society of eighteenth century America. What the
propounders of the misconception fail to mention, however, is
the significant fact that the Madison statement was made in re-
sponse to Governor Randolph of Virginia, who had prophetically
criticized Madison's assertions that the ninth would provide
sufficient protection for the rights of man. Randolph warned that
there was "no criterion by which it could be determined whether any
other particular right was retained or not."'4' Therefore, the fed-
eral government might someday deny the existence of, or dispar-
age, civil liberties that were not specifically listed in the Constitu-
tion with the self-deceiving statement that it could not find any
criterion for their discovery. 42
Actually, Madison, like Hamilton and Justice Wilson, had
himself feared that a specific enumeration of rights might someday
be interpreted so as to deny or disparage others. But he was
persuaded by Jefferson and the general demands of the states that
a bill of rights should be added to the Constitution along with some
form of caveat to cover the danger.43 Indeed, according to one
scholar, Madison did not juxtapose "implied powers against un-
enumerated rights. On the contrary, he indicated that he thought a
line could be drawn between them." 44 Madison had stated, before
41 Id. at 822 n.36, quoting 4 J. SPARKS, CORRESPONDENCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
298 (1855) (emphasis added).
42 In jurisprudence, this might be referred to as an "1 see nothing-or nothing
else--" -approach.
43 See Call, Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 DICK. L. REv. 121, 125 (1960);
Dunbar, supra note 21, at 629-31, 633-43; Rogge, supra note 18, at 789, 792. See also MALONE
168-79. It should be noted that Justice Wilson had been a member of the Constitutional
Convention and Committee on Style. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 115 (1925). He was
also a member of the court in Henfield's Case, an important precedent for federal court
jurisdiction over violations of international law. See Henfield's Case, II F. Cas. 1099 (No.
6360) (C.C.D. Pa. 1793); Paust, supra note 9, at 9 n.10.
44 Rogge, supra note 18, at 792. Madison had also stated, in a letter to Jefferson in 1788,
that
[w]herever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression.
In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government
contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is
the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents.
MALONE 176, quoting 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 272 (G. Hunt ed. 1964).
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the assemblage of the first House of Representatives, that the
argument that a specification of some rights might someday be
misinterpreted to imply a denial of others was the best argument
he had heard against the enumeration of any rights in the Con-
stitution, but he felt confident that his new proposal-the pre-
decessor to the ninth-would sufficiently guard against such at-
tempted abuses of right. 45 Madison knew that "no language is so
copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex idea. 46
He apparently knew that a list of words would be "inadequate to
define all of the rights which man should possess in a free
society."' 47 He expressed a view similar to that of Jefferson when he
noted that a bill of rights could not guarantee even "the most
essential rights" with "the requisite latitude. '48 And he expressed
his certainty "that the rights of conscience, in particular, if submit-
ted to public dtefinition would be narrowed much more than they
are likely to be by an assumed power. 4 9
With this recognition by a primary drafter of the Constitution
that words or lists of words are imperfect symbols for a complete
expression or "enumeration" of all societal expectations of the
existence of rights or goal-values, it would seem incredulous to
assume that the Framers felt that the first eight amendments
contained all of the fundamental human values of their day,5"
operated only as a cut-back on federal powers, and would preclude
the vitality of future values. Indeed, as one Author correctly asserts,
the ninth amendment specifies that certain rights exist and the
tenth amendment specifies that certain powers remain, and it must
45 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435, 439 (1789) [1789-1791]. Specifically, Madison replied to
the argument by stating that his proposals attempt to avoid abuses of right and that rights
enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution were
not to be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by
the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but either as
actual limitations of such power, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
Id. at 435. Additionally, Madison's proposal seems to indicate that he was concerned with
both rights and powers-not merely with a cutback on federal power. See also Kelsey, supra
note 18, at 310; Dunbar, supra note 21, at 635; note 50 infra.
46 THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 236 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).
47 Redlich, supra note 12, at 811. See also Kelley, supra note 40, at 822-23; Kelsey, supra
note 18, at 320.
48 14 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 18 (J. Boyd ed. 1958) (letter from Madison to
Jefferson).
49 Id. To Madison, the freedom of conscience was perhaps the most important right of
all. Kelley, supra note 40, at 824; Redlich, supra note 12, at 806 n.91. Thomas Paine
apparently also felt that some of the natural rights were "imperscriptible." See T. PAINE,
supra note 32, pt. 1, at 122.
30 This is even more clear from the fact that 186 amendments were originally proposed,
of which some 80 were the core. See Ringold, supra note 22, at 4, 6, 31.
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be "evident that there was some distinction in the minds of the
Framers of those amendments between declarations of right and
limitations on or prohibitions of power," or the ninth would have been
completely unnecessary. 51 Indeed, Madison's stated concern with a
"public definition" of the "rights of conscience," as opposed to "an
assumed power," itself stands as evidence of his belief that rights
and powers were entirely different aspects of an integrated con-
stitutional process. Furthermore, to Madison, rights could exist in
areas totally outside the province of government, and could be-
come operable on an- independent foundation, or one separate
from the question of federal powers.52
Although at times the concepts of rights and powers are very
similar, it is important to consider how each is to be separately
exercised. Therein lies a difference between the ninth amendment
"rights" retained by the people and the tenth amendment "powers"
retained by the states and the people, for it seems evident that the
rights are to be exercised regardless of the retained powers or a
retained competence to act and that these rights are to be secured
for the people by all governmental bodies. 53 One holder of the
51 Kelsey, supra note 18, at 310. See Kelley, supra note 40, at 827. Kelley noted that
"Madison was intent on dearly separating rights and powers." Id. (emphasis added). This can
even be seen in one of Madison's proposals to Congress that the enumeration of rights "shall
not be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people,
or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution." I ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789)
[1789-1791] (emphasis added).
2 See Dunbar, supra note 21, at 635-37. By contrast, the author pointed out that James
Wilson "had spoken of rights as 'powers reserved,' and this was a common usage of the
time." Id. at 638.
Thomas Paine also made a distinction between rights and powers. Although still
believing that many natural rights were protected by nature, Paine stated that "civil rights
are those which appertain to man" in his relation to society and are those "to which his
individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent"; but he added that "natural
rights which he retains, are all those in which the power to execute is as perfect in the
individual as the right itself." See T. PAINE, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 39. Of course, Jefferson
had sought a protection of the rights of man against any governmental encroachment, state
or federal. See MALONE 153, 158, 168, 176. Paine's description of individual power, it must
be remembered, was the power of an individual in an eighteenth century society.
53 Of course, the Declaration of Independence itself contained this view, asserting that
it is a "self-evident" truth that "all men" have "certain unalienable rights," that governments
are to secure these rigbts, and that "whenever any form of government becomes destructive
of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new
government." This jurisprudential outlook of the same men who would later frame the
Constitution dearly evinces the distinction between inalienable rights and granted govern-
mental powers, for although the government has been granted the power to act it must still
guarantee and effectively secure these rights for "all men" while it functions. Clearly the
rights are not to be diminished by grants of power to those governments.
, Furthermore, the express declaration of the tenth amendment that "powers" are
reserved to the people seems to imply the popular expectation that governments, when they
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second misconception, Professor Redlich, discovered this differ-
ence between retained rights and powers,5 4 but he was content to
ignore its potential use in the discovery of a broad constitutional
scheme for rights protection set up by the Framers. Quite curi-
ously, he concluded that rights which were expressly retained "by
the people" could be circumscribed by the states, though this could
not be done by the federal government. 55
2. The "Non-Inherent Rights Approach"
The second argument derived from the misconception that
the ninth amendment is a cut-back on the power granted to the
federal government is based upon the notion that the rights of
man which are expressly retained "by the people" were not so
retained against another governmental entity set up by men-the
states. 5 6 That this is nothing but a further misconception, however,
is evident from the context in which our nation was founded and
the popular expectations of authority and legal right. The Ameri-
can rebels had just expressed to the world that certain expectations
were "self-evident" truths. Among these were the fundamental
expectations that "all men" have "certain unalienable rights" and
deny the existence of these rights of man, or fail to secure them for the people, can be
altered or dissolved by the people either peacefully or by revolution. See Locke, An Essay
Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government § 135, in SOCIAL
CONTRACT-ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROUSSEAU 79 (E. Barker ed. 1962) [hereinafter
cited as Locke, with page references to Barker collection]. It appears that "Madison was
firmly convinced that the people were 'the only legitimate fountain of power' and the
'fountain of authority.'" Call, supra note 43, at 128, citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 49, 51 (A.
Hamilton). Judge Call properly criticizes language in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947), to the effect that fundamental rights have been diminished to the
extent of the constitutional grants of power to the federal government. Call, supra note 43 1,
at 130. Kelley also criticized that language as emanating from "a basic misconception as to
the meaning of the ninth amendment.... [I]n no case could [federal powers] transgress the
limitations imposed by individual rights." Kelley, supra note 40, at 827. See also Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). The Court in that case stated that there "can be uo
limitation on the power of the people of the United States." Id. at 236. Subsequent cases
have reiterated this notion. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-05 (1819); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I
Wheat.) 303, 324-26 (1816); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). Ware v. Hylton
was also cited in Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1879), because, as we are
told, "it show[ed] the views of a powerful legal mind of that early period, when the debates
in the Convention that framed the Constitution must have been fresh in the memory of the
leading jurists of the country." Id. at 489.
-4 Redlich, supra note 12, at 807.
55 Id. at 805-06, 808. Redlich added that the fourteenth amendment applied those
restrictions to the states in 1868.
-5 See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 40, at 815. Contra, B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH
AMENDMENT 36 (1955).
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that all governments are created "to secure these rights"-not to
ignore them or to be immune from the express duty to protect and
secure them for the people.57 In view of this historic declaration, it
makes little sense to postulate that the state governments, set up by
these same men after the American Revolution, were to be permit-
ted to circumscribe the fundamental rights of man. It would be
more accurate to assume that these rights were to be recognized,
respected, and protected by all governments or branches of gov-
ernment that these men would create.
Indeed, Jefferson had written to Madison that "a bill of rights
is what the people are entitled to against every government on
earth, general or particular, & what no just government should
refuse, or rest on inferences. '5 8 The state of Virginia had ratified
the Constitution with an "impression," or a disclosed understand-
ing, that certain "essential and unalienable rights of the people"
remained. 59 And this expectation of a continued existence of the
rights of man, enforceable even against the state, although they are
not enumerated in state constitutive instruments, must have been
commonly held, since the people of several states found no need at
all to specify that even one right of the people continued to exist
after the formation of the state government."0
In fact, the application of the ninth amendment to the states
would have been completely consistent with the general expecta-
tions of the Founders pertaining to the relationship between gov-
ernments and the rights of men. This is evident in their early
writings and is expressly recognized in several of the early state
constitutions 1 which affirm that state governments are bound by
the rights of man, not only in the sense that these rights constitute
a restraint upon state power but also in the sense that rights of man
and the public interest shall guide the governmental functionaries
in proper governmental decision-making and require action to
promote these rights. The earliest constitution, that of Virginia,
had clearly expressed these expectations; it also declared that "all
men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
57 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776). See notes 30, 31, 32 & 36 supra.
51 4 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 477 (P. Ford ed. 1894).
59 Kelsey, supra note 18, at 314-15.
60 See Kelley, supra note 40, at 816 n.10. See also B. WRIGHT, AMIERICAN
INTERPRETATION OF NATURAL LAW 112-14 (1962). The states were: Connecticut, Georgia,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and South Carolina. It does not seem plausible that
the people had no fundamental rights in these states merely because none were specifically
enumerated.
61 See note 62 infra.
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inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society,
they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity. '62
Since the natural, essential, inherent and inalienable rights of
man were binding on the states by express recognition in most of
the state constitutions, their recognition in the ninth amendment
must have been, as Jefferson would declare, rights "against every
government on earth" and "what no just government should
refuse. 6
3
Moreover, as even such proponents of the second misconcep-
tion as Professor Kelly recognize, "[a]t the time the Constitution
was drafted, nearly every political leader in the country was a
disciple of the natural law" school of juristic thought and was
greatly influenced by the writings of Locke and Coke.64 These
juristic expectations of the day, as Kelly notes, held that the natural
62 VA. CONST. bill of rights, §§ 1, 2, 3 (1776). The contemporaneous view of the
Founders was that the dead cannot bind the living, that authority and laws derive their being
from the consent of the living, and that, as Thomas Paine stated, "[e]very generation is and
must be competent to all the purposes which its occasions require." See T. PAINE, supra note
32, at 8, 11 passim. Jefferson has been quoted on the axiom of natural law as saying "that the
earth belongs in usufruct to the living," and that "[e]very constitution, then, and every law,
naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force and not
of fight." MALONE 179. Thus, authority exists in the living. It has also been said that "[w]hen
decisions are authoritative but not controlling, they are not law but pretense; when decisions
are controlling but not authoritative, they are not law but naked power." Lasswell &
McDougal, supra note 16, at 384.
The constitutions of Pennsylvania and Vermont repeated this expectancy while adding
that the inherent rights were natural and inalienable. PA. CONST. declaration of rights, § 1
(1776); VT. CONST. ch. I, § 1 (1786). Similarly, the constitution of Massachusetts referred to
"certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights" (MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1 (1780)), while
the constitution of New Hampshire referred to "certain natural, essential, and inherent
rights." N.H. CONST. pt. I, arts. 2, 4, 5 (1784); cf. id art. 3. And the contemporaneous
reference to the "invaluable fights of man" appeared in the Pennsylvania Declaration of
Rights of 1790. See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 28, at 327. This expression of the
"rights of man" was used by Jefferson, Paine, and others as well. See, e.g., T. PAINE, THE
RIGHTS OF MAN (1792). It had an earlier synonym in the liberties and free customs of man.
For a documented development of the expression, see SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra
note 28, at 17, 26, 74, 101.
63 See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
64 Kelley, supra note 40, at 815; see E. CORWIN, supra note 13, at 2, 132; Corwin, supra
note 14, at 153, 394-96, 399; Franklin, The Relation of the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, 4 How. L.J. 170, 174 (1958); Kutner, The Neglected Ninth
Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 121, 125 (1967);
Kauper, The Higher Law and the Rights of Man in a Revolutionary Society, lecture at A.E.I.
bicentennial series, Old North Church, Boston, Mass., Nov. 7, 1973. See also Henfield's Case,
II F. Cas. 1099, 1107 (No. 6360) (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (interesting charge to jury by Justice
Wilson, former member of Constitutional Convention, declaring law of nature obligatory on
individuals and all state citizens still subject to all obligations owed universal society of
human race); DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, preamble (1776) (reference to "Law of
Nature").
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rights of men "were inalienable . . . could not be affected by
governmental action .... [and] could not be given up and were not
subject to constraint by the political authority which men
established. '6 5 But later in his article Kelly concluded that the
states could subjugate these same human values and that federal
courts could not protect them unless they were enumerated some-
where in the Federal Constitution or could somehow fit under the
"due process" clause. In view of the naturalist philosophy, this
interpretation would not have been possible, since even the "due
process" concept seems limited by its terms to some governmental
process. And to the naturalist-oriented Framers, these rights of
man simply could not be given up, nor could they be subject to
constraint by the political frameworks which men created, whether
these frameworks happened to be state or federal.6 6
Professor Redlich, however, completely misconstrues the na-
ture of these juristic expectations. He tries to argue that the states
must not have been restrained at all, by repeating an unsupport-
able myth that "men looked to the states as the chief guardians of
individual rights" and not to themselves.67 But even this statement,
that the states were to be "guardians" of these rights, implies that
the states cannot abrogate them and that the rights must be
protected if some entity of the state attempts to deny or disparage
them, for the "guardian" of rights, by definition, must guard
against their denial or disparagement from any source. Redlich
also argues that it would be "unrealistic to attribute ... an intent to
impose ill-defined legally enforceable restraints on the states in
light of" a rejection of some of Madison's proposals for additional
amendments. 68 But the relevance of this argument seems hidden
6 See Kelley, supra note 40, at 816.
Id.; see Locke 79. Locke had concluded: "Thus the law of nature stands as an
eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other men's
actions must ... be conformable to the law of nature...." Id. See also WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 58; Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (contemporary
view); Kauper, supra note 64; note 58 and accompanying text supra.
" Redlich, supra note 12, at 808; see id. at 806. Professor Kauper emphasizes that,
significantly, many state constitutions contained declarations of right as proof that state
constitutions did not create these rights, but recognized them. Kauper, supra note 64.
6 Redlich, supra note 12, at 806. Professor Redlich's curious reasoning largely ignores
the naturalist fears of all goveruments (but see id. at 807), and the premise that governments
are created for men-not men for governments. The ninth does not even mention the state;
it declares that these rights are reserved to "the people." See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 655, 662-63 (1874). That case stated that there are reserved individual rights
which are beyond the control of the state-otherwise we would have no restraints on the
majority and we would suffer the "despotism of the many." See also Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 303, 324-27 (1816); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388
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and, perhaps, relates to the confusion between grants of power and
the retention of rights which the holders of this misconception
seem to share.
What emerges from the expectations of the Framers disclosed
above is a scheme of rights and powers that can be articulated
briefly. First, ultimate authority comes from the people, the aggre-
gate of a full and free sharing and shaping of power by all
individuals.6:9 Some of this authority is delegated conditionally by
the people to governmental entities and becomes representative
authority through a dynamic process that constitutes the govern-
mental structure and its sub-processes. With the conditional trans-
fer of this authority, there is the creation of authoritative
"power" -i.e., competence-in the governmental entities to the
extent so constituted; but the persons entrusted with governmental
powers are the trustees and servants of the public and they remain
fully accountable to the public. Second, when the federal govern-
ment was constituted, certain state powers were also retained for a
comprehensive system of authoritative government. Third, the
proper function of all government, that is, the purpose and condi-
tion of the grant of authority and power, is to secure the rights of
the populace. Fourth, certain fundamental rights of the populace,
both joint and individual, are expressly recognized in both federal
and state constitutive instruments, but others that are not enumer-
ated are expressly retained by the people, as an aggregate of all
individuals, despite the transfer of a certain measure of authority
and power to the constituted governmental entities.
7 0
(1798). But see Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). The misconceptions were
expressed later in Barron, and have been properly criticized by scholars. See, e.g., B.
PATrERSON, supra note 56, at 13, 37; Ringold, supra note 23, at 16, 24. At least one author
has also noted that holders of this view seem to confuse rights and powers. See B.
PATTERSON, supra note 56, at 37-41; Ringold, supra note 23, at 24 n.57.
69 This notion of authority, that "the individual human being as the ultimate unit of all
law rises sovereign over the limited province of the State," also finds acceptance in the
international law of human rights and has a long history of affirmation and development.
See, e.g., H. .AUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27, 34-35, 120, passim
(1968 reprint); McDougal & Bebr, supra note 8, at 603-06, 608. Here one should recall the
transnational significance of Thomas Paine's statement that the authority of the people is
"the only authority in which government has a right to exist in any country." T. PAINE, supra
note 32, at 85.
70 In fact, as stated, that transfer is conditioned upon the continuous fulfillment of
rights-a fact which relates to the full meaning of "authority" and which is of increasing
significance to the expansion of Presidential powers, the relative aloofness of certain
Congressional perspectives, the continued entrenchment of a fourth branch of government,
bureaucracy, and the diminishing effort expended by the judiciary for the promotion of
human dignity and the maintenance of an ideological or policy matrix for which our
forebears fought and which is, truly, still at issue around the globe.
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C. The Rule of Construction and the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments Arguments
The third main argument against a broad role for the ninth
amendment in the guarantee of fundamental human values and
liberties is the notion that the ninth was adopted merely as a "rule
of construction" for interpretation of the rest of the Constitution.71
Some of the holders of this misconception add, however, that the
ninth is useful in "pointing" to the utility of the "due process"
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.7 2 This "supple-
mental" view is actually the foundation for the fourth main argu-
ment against greater use of the ninth: that the ninth is now of little
importance since the fifth and fourteenth can cover the field.7 3
But, as noted, the phrase "due process" seems limited to some
form of governmental activity.74 Although a comprehensive ap-
proach would not be entirely limited to restrictions upon actions of
governmental bodies, because a due process of government would
also entail the promotion of the rights of man in view of the
fundamental expectation that government is constituted in order
to "secure" these rights against infringement, regardless of the
source of infringement. Even then, however, the "due process"
language may not be broad enough to guarantee the effective
observance and protection of fundamental human rights in ongo-
ing social processes, as the broad language of the ninth amend-
ment seems to require. Moreover, these two misconceptions not
only ignore the plain fact that the term "others" in the ninth
amendment must'refer to rights other than those found within the
first eight amendments, or to rights other than the specifically
enumerated rights-such as the right of "due process," but they
also ignore the nature of the jurisprudential expectations of the
Framers and the human context which existed at the time of the
adoption of the ninth amendment. Professor Kelley illustrates both
of these misconceptions in stating that the ninth amendment is
7' See, e.g., E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 63-64
(1957); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 651 (5th
ed. 1905); Call, supra note 43, at 129-30; Dunbar supra note 21, at 641-43; Franklin, supra
note 64, at 170 & 177; Kelley, supra note 40, at 825; Comment, Unenumerated Rights
-Substantive Due Process, the Ninth Amendment, and John Stuart Mill, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 922,
930 (1971).
72 See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 40, at 815.
,' See, e.g., id.; Kutner, supra note 64, at 134-35; and Comment, Wis. L. REv., supra note
71, at 931, 936 (due process and ninth amendment are not "coequal"). See also Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-84 (1964).
74 See, e.g., E. CORWiN, supra note 13, at 124 (equating "due process" with limits on
"governmental powers"); id. at 143 ("state action" doctrine); p. 250 supra.
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only a rule of construction .... not the source of these rights, nor
is it a vehicle for protecting them. Rather, it points to other parts
of the Constitution-particularly the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments-as the contexts within which
unenumerated rights are to be determined. 75
Although it is true that the ninth is not the ultimate source of these
rights, Kelley's other statements are clearly wrong on at least two
counts: (1) the ninth does not "point" to the fifth or any other
amendment, but is expressly detached from the specific language
of any of them; and (2) it certainly could not have pointed to the
fourteenth since that amendment did not come into existence for
another seventy-nine years. The express detachment from. the
specific language of any other amendment seems to mean that the
ninth was adopted not as a mere "rule of construction" of the
enumerated rights or the other provisions of the Constitution, but
as a recognition of the existence of "others" not listed.7 6 The ninth is
also an express command that these rights are not to be denied or
disparaged merely because they are not enumerated in the Con-
stitution.
III
THE UNENUMERATED RIGHTS PROTECTED BY THE
NINTH AMENDMENT
There should be no debate as to whether fundamental rights
of man exist; there should merely be inquiries concerning the
proper identification of the boundaries and content of those rights.
In our juristic records there have been demonstrations of certain
views about these rights. There have been statements that the first
ten amendments did not create new rights but provided a constitu-
tional scheme for the guarantee of older, and indeed ancient,
rights of the people.7 7 The view has been expressed that the Bill of
Rights includes those rights "arising out of 'Natural Laws,' 'inher-
ent' in the structure of any society, or at least any civilized
75 Kelley, supra note 40, at 815.
76 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-34 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(ninth amendment may well include right to education, to work, and to recreation);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,488-93 (1964) (Warren, C.J., & Goldberg & Brennan,
JJ., concurring) (ninth amendment protects right to privacy in marriage); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) (rights and liberties not protected by "custom and tradition alone,"
implying that they are protected by custom and tradition or by inherited expectations of
right and liberty). Furthermore, as we have noted, Kelley recognized that these rights of
man are inalienable. Kelley, supra note 40, at 816, 823. Inalienable rights must exist in spite
of the Constitution-not merely because of its language.
"' See, e.g., Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897); Weimer v. Bunbury, 30
Mich. 201, 214 (1874).
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society,"78 and that these retained rights of men are "natural,
inherent, and fundamental rights. '79 Other descriptions of these
human expectancies have been couched in terms of "the traditions
and conscience of our people,"80 or shared values which can gain
content for rights identification from specific guarantees and from
an ongoing "experience with the requirements of a free society. 81
And it has been said that "all rights in the Constitution are really
human rights, since they are exercised by human beings against
human beings. 8 2
In the past, courts have not merely used American values to
discover the content of these rights, but have also used a test based
upon a dynamic and "universal sense of justice,"8 3 something
"universally thought,"84 the unanimity of the civilized nations of the
world,8 5 the international "custom of war, 's and norms of "human
rights" law.8 7' Indeed, many commentators have considered that
international human rights, as they are found to have a universally
shared content, are "the main core of rational objectives not only of
the United Nations but of all democratic government. 88 What is
78 L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2 (1958); see Wright, Conflicts ofInternational Law with
National Laws and Ordinances, 11 Am. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1917). Wright notes that there have been
dicta in United States courts to the effect that statutes in conflict with natural law are void.
Id. at 9.
79 Note, supra note 20, at 106; see Corwin, supra note 14, at 152-53.
80 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 493 (1964); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
"I Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1964) (Warren, C.J., & Goldberg & Brennan JJ., concur-
ring). For a discussion of related standards to test the evolving meaning of rights, see case
cited note 89 infra. See also cases cited in Ringold, supra note 23, at 25, 37-38 passim.
It has been recognized that the criticism ofjudicial use of the ninth, based on a fear of
engaging in arbitrary decision-making, is, at best, naive since it ignores the fact that the first
eight amendments are sufficiently broad that they are also subject to the same judicial abuse
of interpretative power. Kutner, supra note 64, at 130, 133; see M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL
& J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORMD PUBLIC ORDER (1967);
Branden, The Search for Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 57 YALE LJ. 571 (1948).
82 Z. CHAFFEE, How HUMAN RIGHTS GOT INTO THE CONSTITUTION 1 (1952).
83 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
84 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
85 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958).
86 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134 (1879).
87 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Palmigiano v. Travisano, 317 F.
Supp. 776, 785 (D.R.I. 1970); see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 320 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); id. at 257, 270-71 (Brennan, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100
(1956). See also Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 673 (1948); Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore.
579, 604, 204 P.2d 569, 579 (1949).
88 McDougal & Leighton, supra note 7, at 60; see McDougal & Arens, The Genocide
Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L REV. 683, 708 (1950); Wright, Toward a
Universal Law for Mankind, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 435 (1963).
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surprising, however, is not that this interrelationship between
human rights and the ninth amendment exists, but that it has to be
explained at all in the twentieth century.8
We sometimes forget that certain rights and values did not
have to be enumerated with particularity in the eighteenth century,
but could be covered by the general language in the ninth. Those
rights and values were almost "guaranteed" by the expectations of
the people and man's environmental context-they were "natural"
rights of man and "self evident" truths. As Bertrand Russell
disclosed, the "eighteenth-century doctrine of natural rights is a
search for Euclidean axioms in politics," by which it "appeared to
be possible to discover things about the actual world by first
noticing what is self-evident and then using deduction." 90 Sir
Hersh Lauterpacht added:
From the very inception the theories of natural law were
generalizations from actual experience. They were attempts to
put in the form of general law the fact of a uniformity as
ascertained by observation and study of evidence . . Their
authors endeavoured to form laws of conduct by reference to the
nature of man, to his physical and mental constitution as they
saw it, and to his station and purpose in the scheme of creation
as they perceived it from the contemplation of the world around
them.91
Moreover. as Lauterpacht pointed out,
The authors of the Declaration of Independence referred to
its principles as expressive of self-evident truths. There is, in that
confident application of the Euclidian principle of self-evident
truths to the notion of natural rights of man, an assertion, which
is far from being arbitrary, of a direct relation between natural
rights and scientific laws. 92
Hamilton had stated that the "sacred rights of mankind are not to
be rumaged for among old parchments or musty records"--a
favorite sport of the later legal "positivists"--but "are written, as
with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature."93 But as
11 See B. PATTERSON, supra note 56, at 2-3. By 1955 the ninth had "heen invoked hy
litigants as a defense of human rights only ten times in our entire jurisprudence." Id. The
use of the ninth has not succeeded since, either, except in a partial recognition in Griswold.
381 U.S. at 484.
90 B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 36 (1945). The eighteenth century
has also been described as the era of "rational humanism" which was an historic foundation
for the development of documented international human rights. See, e.g., E. SCHWELB,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 12-13 (1964); McDougal & Bebr, supra
note 8, at 604-06.
91 H. LAIuTERPACHT, supra note 25, at 98.
92 Id. at 101.
93 Id at 101 n. I1, quoting J. ACTON, THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM AND OTHER ESSAYS 587
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technological and sociological developments altered the human
context and precipitated new human needs or affected old ones,
those "natural" guarantees sometimes lost their effect or disap-
peared. If we are to guarantee to ourselves and our children these
inherited values and the fundamental rights of man in the modern
context, then the courts must take an affirmative role in the
application of developed human values and the protection of
fundamental expectations. The courts must not be permissive in
the face of value deprivations. "We must never forget," Chief
Justice Marshall warned, "that it is a constitution we are expound-
ing ... a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and,
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs. '9 4 The ninth amendment, as part of that dynamic instru-
ment of the people, must be similarly utilized to meet contempo-
rary needs and expectancies of fundamental rights. :15
It seems quite proper for certain twentieth century courts or
judges to have rejected phrases such as "natural laws," "inherent
rights," a "sense of justice," or "experience With the requirements
of a free society" as especially useful or complete references for the
identification of the content of unenumerated rights.96 But,
it is not proper for courts to have rejected the existence of these
rights, and the ninth amendment, merely because legal positivism
has subsequently, and improperly, demanded a reliance upon
enumerated words.97 Each of'the above phrases offers an incom-
(1907) (quoting without citation A. Hamilton). The concern for "musty records and mouldy
parchments," instead of the will of the living, was also condemned by Thomas Paine. T.
PAINE, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 12. See also id. at 8, 11, 42, 85.
94 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis added); see Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (interpreting meaning of eighth amendment "from the evolving standards of de-
cency"); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (stating that eighth amendment
"may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice"); Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821) (declaring that "a constitution is framed for
ages to come, and is designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can");
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 326-27 (1816) (stating that Constitution
was written in general terms to enable it to be dynamic and adapt to future).
95 See B. PATTERSON, supra note 56, at iii-iv, 2-3. In his introduction to the Patterson
work, Dean Roscoe Pound declared that the "Ninth Amendment is a solemn declaration that
natural rights are not a fixed category of reasonable human expectations in civilized society."
Id. at iv. See also Ringold, supra note 23, passim & cases cited therein; Note, Ninth Amendment
Vindication of Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 46, 54 (1968); articles cited
note 18 supra.
96 For an apt criticism of similar phrases, by themselves, to guide rational and policy-
serving decision, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257, 270-71, 277-78 (1971) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan wants "objective indicators" of "the conscience of
mankind" and human dignity values. Id. at 278.
,7 See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
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plete referent open to a great deal of arbitrary decisional leeway.
The problem is not that they are incorrect per se, but that they are
insufficient in themselves to provide guidance for rational and
policy-responsive decision-making.
In the aggregate, however, these generalizations point to the
kind of inquiry a court might properly make. If rights are "inher-
ent" in a dynamic social process, "natural" to a civilized society,
based on a "universal sense of justice," or tied to the ongoing
"experience" of a free society, a court need not hide from them
merely because these phrases are themselves too general. The
decision-maker needs, instead, a set of criterial referents to pull the
shared content of these rights out of the social process with which
they are merged. An initial effort has been made by the courts in
their attempts to identify "the traditions and conscience of our
people"s-the shared expectations-as they intertwine with an
"experience with the requirements of a free society" 99-actual
context and the interconnected social, legal, and political processes.
In more general terms, these two indicia of the content of
rights can be referred to as patterns of authority, which include
empirically demonstrable subjectivities of *the people, and patterns
of practice or control, the mergence of which has been insightfully
recognized as law in social process. 100 Not only are the perspectives
of the people important, but the social context as a whole is also
relevant for a mapping of the intertwined patterns of authority
and control. Even this, however, is only a beginning of the more
comprehensive type of inquiry which is needed for identification of
"traditions," "collective conscience," "experience," and other as-
pects of legal process.
Nevertheless, this beginning points to the great utility of
documented international human rights as one set of indicia of the
shared subjectivities and experience of mankind-indicia which are
useful, as well, in a comprehensive inquiry into the types of
policies, or goal-values, which the Constitution seeks to protect, the
types of policies which, under the United Nations Charter and
other treaty law, the United States must also seek to respect and
observe,101 the other types of shared subjectivities that our own
people possess, and the kind of "experience" in which our society
,8 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); see note 80 and accompanying text
supra.
'9 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see note 81 and
accompanying text supra.
100 See, e.g., articles cited note 16 supra.
101 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); note 10 supra; see Henfield's Case,
11 F. Cas. 1099 (No. 6360) (C.C.D. Pa. 1793); Paust, supra note 9; note 43 supra.
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has participated and continues to participate. Documented human
rights are sufficiently particularized for such a judicial discovery.
They are also sufficiently particularized to give a more detailed and
useful content to expressions such as "the traditions and collective
conscience of our people" or a "universal sense of justice," which
our courts are already applying. Indeed, it would seem impossible
to consider the traditions and collective conscience of this nation,
not to mention universal norms, without systematic reference to
the rights of man.
Furthermore, the discovery and interpretation of the funda-
mental rights of man are proper judicial functions. For assistance,
the courts can find empirical referents to shared legal expectation
in human declarations, social practice, court decisions, legislation,
writings of legal scholars, and in universally accepted standards of
human rights.)1 2 In utilizing standards of fundamental human
rights, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights," 3
as a means of interpreting the nature and content of rights which
already exist and are retained by the people under the ninth
amendment, a court would not violate recognized legal principles
concerning "political questions," judicial intervention, or the doc-
trinal hurdle of "self-executing treaties,"'1 4 since these rights al-
ready exist and would merely be protected by the court through a
more rational, policy-serving decisional effort. No affirmative or
particularized mode of implementation or any "opera-
tionalizing"'15 of these rights would be demanded; the court would
102 See notes 7 & 101 supra.
113 Note 6 supra. For a history of relevant developments, see J. CAREY, UN PROTECTION
OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 9-16, 177-87 (1970); McDougal & Bebr, supra note 8, at
637-40.
Professor Brownlie asserts that the Declaration is not binding as such, but that some of
its provisions "either constitute general principles of law . . . or represent elementary
considerations of humanity." He also points out that they have "considerable indirect legal
effect" as an authoritative interpretation of the Charter by the General Assembly, and have
been regarded as part of the "law of the United Nations." I. BROWNL!E, BASIC DOCUMENTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 106 (1971).
Many scholars have declared that the entire Universal Declaration is now part of the
customary law of human rights. See J. CAREY, supra at 13-14. It is the most authoritative and
frequently recited resolution of the UN General Assembly, and there can be no doubt of its
general acceptance by all nation-states as a binding documentation of basic human rights.
See, e.g., sources cited supra in this note; J. PAUST & A. BLAUSTEIN, WAR CRIMES JURISDICTION
AND DUE PROCEsS-A CASE STUDY OF BANGLADESH (1974); Paust, Human Rights, Human
Relations and Overseas Command, 3 ARMY LAW. I (1973).
104 This term relates to the old efforts to "implement" treaty law by way of article VI of
the Constitution rather than attempt to use internationally documented human rights to aid
in the interpretation of the nature and content of those rights of man that were retained by
our Forefathers. See notes 10 & II supra.
105 By this term is meant the efficacious application or implementation of these rights.
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merely strike down governmental and private modes or practices
which do not conform. There would be no judicial interference
with the legislative discretion to select a particular mode of im-
plementation from among the proper types available, but there
would be a judicial guarantee against legislative or other infringe-
ment of basic human rights. 10 6 Moreover, as a prominent interna-
tional jurist declares, "it is increasingly recognized that there is a
human rights dimension to every human interaction and every
authoritative decision."' 0 7 Again, action or inaction by the courts
will have its effect.
IV
A SKETCH OF THE TYPES OF DISCOVERABLE RIGHTS
A. Inherited Expectations
Besides the fundamental rights which have been protected
under notions of due process, 0 there are several documentations
of the basic human values and liberties that were most likely among
those cherished by the framers of the ninth amendment. For
example, Kelsey lists certain discovered "natural rights" including
personal liberty, personal security, property, religious freedom,
freedom of conscience, freedom to contract, freedom to work, the
right of privacy, resistance to arbitrary authority, the pursuit of
happiness and safety, and the enjoyment of life and liberty.'09
Rogge would add the freedom of movement and rights to knowl-
edge, confrontation with representative authorities, political activ-
106 See Corwin, supra note 14, at 408-09 n.137. See also F. PoLLocK, THE EXPANSION OF
THE COMMON LAw 128 (1904). Note in this regard that it is already a federal crime for "two
or more persons" to "conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970); see 18 U.S.C. § 242 (outlawing actions
taken "under color of any law... or custom," which deprive persons of rights, privileges, or
immunities); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-86 (1970) (providing for civil suit under Civil Rights Act). See
also 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821 (1970) (providing for prosecutions to preserve human rights in
time of armed conflicts); Paust, supra note 9. The Supreme Court has addressed the
constitutionality of sanctions under 18 U.S.C. § 241 in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
753-74 (1966), and United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 805-06 (1966). See Parker v.
McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553, 556 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156 (3d
Cir. 1972); Clark v. Ziedonis, 368 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
107 McDougal, supra note 3, at 387.
108 For a listing of some of these rights, see articles cited note 73 supra.
109 Kelsey, supra note 18, at 313-14. Jefferson had emphasized two inalienable rights:
the sanctity of the person and freedom of the mind. Interrelated with these were his belief
that "the dignity of man is lost in arbitrary distinctions," his recommendation of "a crusade
against ignorance" and an effort to "establish and improve the law for educating the
common people," and his emphasis on the "opinion of the people" as the basis of
government. MALONE 153-56, 158, 169.
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ity, use of the mails, and peaceful picketing or protest. 110 Call
would include the important right of the people to have the
government function in the public interest and for the common
good.111
This last recognized right, that public interest must be the
measure of public action, seems to be related to the naturalist
framers' concept that each citizen has an equal political interest in
public questions and has equal political rights, including access to
the governmental process and an equal voice in its affairs-access
to a free and full shaping and sharing of power. It also seems to be
related to the concept that any effective denial of the individual's
right to political participation in governmental decision-making,
through undue deference to minority views or special interest
groups by those who hold public office or have public respon-
sibilities, is itself a denial or disparagement by decisional bodies of
an aggregate of individual trust-or a denial of the public trust and
an "undue" process of law and government. Thomas Paine ex-
pressly recognized this right tofull participation as the saving quality
of a representative democracy and added an interrelated "right to
know": "In the representative system the reason for every thing
must publicly appear. Every man is a proprietor in government,
and considers it a necessary part of his business to understand ....
There can be no mystery."' 12
Corwin made a thorough study of our inherited values and
expectations, and within his work one can discover the basic
expectations of human equality,1 13 human dignity, 1 4 the sanctity
of the home,1 15 the binding force of contracts, 1 6 property
rights, 1 7 popular sovereignty,1 18 the right to have governmental
110 Rogge, supra note 18, at 804-26.
"' Call, supra note 43, at 122. This might be described as the right to have governmen-
tal bodies decide public questions in the public interest. See Locke 76, 78-80, 84, 143
(government limited to public good and cannot enslave, impoverish, or destroy subjects; laws
must be designed for common good). See also DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776); U.S.
CONsT. preamble. Thomas Paine described "resistance of oppression" as one of the "natural
and imperscriptible rights of man." T. PAINE, supra note 32, pt. 1, at 122.
"2 T. PAINE, supra note 32, pt. 11, at 26. Also relevant is Paine's statement that laws
continue to derive their force from the consent of the living and that authority exists in the
people. Id. at 8, 85. For related views of Jefferson, see MALONE 153, 155, 158, 169.
213 Compare Corwin, supra note 14, at 161 with UNIVERSAL DECLARATION arts. 1, 2, 7, 8.
114 Compare Corwin, supra note 14, at 169 (citing the thoughts of John Adams) with
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION arts. 1-6, 12, 22, 25.
1 ", Compare Corwin, supra note 14, at 371 with UNIVERSAL DECLARATION arts. 3, 12,
16(3).
126 Corwin, supra note 14, at 167.
117 Conpare id. with UNIVERSAL DECLARATION art. 17.
218 Compare Corwin, supra note 14, at 162 with UNIVERSAL DECLARATION art. 21.
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decisions conform to the public interest, '" and the fundamental
expectancy that justice is not to be tied to the written word. 120
Today, in view of our inherited values and present human needs,
Justice Douglas would wish to add the rights to recreation, clean
air, and clean water. 121 Since the Framers looked upon Locke as an
authoritative source and our own values seem parallel, great weight
could also be given to his identification of the following types of
human rights: liberty and freedom, equality, life, limb, health,
property, peace, safety, governmental functioning according to
laws, the public interest and common good, and the right of
revolution whenever the government does not effectuate these
rights. 122 This right of revolution, in Locke's view, is not vested in
the minority of an identifiable society who seek to come to power
or to destroy the social compact based upon the will of the
community as a whole, but rather this right lies with the
majority. 123
B. Value Categories
It is clear that the deeper one explores, the more our inherited
goal-values come into focus. A most useful and comprehensive
""n Conpare Corwin, supra note 14, at 165 with UNIVERSAL DECLARATION arts. 28, 29(2).
121) Corwin, supra note 14, at 158-60. Compare id. at 98 (act against natural equity is void)
with UNIVERSAL DECLARATION arts. 29, 30. This last comparison is most difficult to make so
far.
121 Set' Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 233-34 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For
additional supportive writings, see Ringold, supra note 23, at 53 n.153. See also UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION arts. 22, 24, 25(1), 27, 28; 1966 INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS arts. 1(2). 12(2)(b), 15, G.A. Res 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6546 (1966). It is difficult directly to compare protections of
human quality and life quality with present values connected with environmental protection,
but it seems that these values are interdependent.
,2' See Locke 4-6, 76-77, 79, 84, 122-43.
123 Id. at 57-58, 142-43: see VA. CONsT. art. I, § 3 (1776) (right of "a majority of the
community" to abolish government). It is arguable, under Locke's view, that an identifiable
social group could properly claim a right of secession, since it would not be seeking to
extend its values or to subjugate democratic values of others, but merely to defend its own.
President Lincoln was haunted by a desire to reach the proper balance on the problem, as
evidenced by his first Inaugural Address. He believed that
[i]f, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any
clearly-written Constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify
revolution: it certainly would, if such a right were a vital one.
LINCOLN'S STORIES AND SPEECHES 209 (E. Allen ed. 1900). But at the same time he viewed
secession as "the essence of anarchy" (id. at 210), a notion against which he attempted to
balance his conviction that
[t]his country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever
they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitu-
tional right of amending, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it.
Id. at 212.
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overview of the types of values that are discoverable, however, has
already been provided by the value matrix worked out by Profes-
sors McDougal and Lasswell in reference to "man's long struggle
for all his basic human values," that is:
for participation in the processes by which he is governed,
equality before the law, and that wide sharing of power, both
formal and real, which we call democracy;
for sanctity of person, for freedom from arbitrary restraints
and cruel and inhuman punishments, and for positive opportun-
ity to develop latent talents for the enrichment and well-being of
personality;
for the enlightenment by which rational decisions can be
made and for freedom of inquiry and opinion;
for that fundamental respect for human dignity which both
precludes discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion, polit-
ical opinion, or other ground irrelevant to capacity and provides
positive recognition of common merit as a human being and
special merit as an individual;
for access to resources to produce goods and services neces-
sary to maintain rising standards of living and comfort;
for acquisition of the skills necessary to express talent and to
achieve individual and community values to the fullest;
for freedom to explain life, the universe, and values, to fix
standards of rectitude, and to worship God or gods as may seem
best;
for affection, fraternity, and congenial personal relation-
ships in groups freely chosen;
for, in sum, a security which includes not only freedom from
violence and threats of violence but also full opportunity to
preserve and increase all values by peaceful, noncoercive
procedures.1 2
4
These value categories provide a manageable reference to the
types of goal-values expected or claimed, and to the values in-
volved in a given instance of social interaction. When integrated
124 M. McDouGAL, supra note 8, at 336-37.
It is for values such as these that men have always framed constitutions,
established governments, and sought that delicate balancing of power and formula-
tion of fundamental principle necessary to preserve human rights against all
possible aggressors, governmental and other.
Id. at 337. See H. LASSWELL, A PRE-VIEW OF POLICY SCIENCES (1971); H. LASSWELL & A.
KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCxErY (1950). For a comprehensive framework for analysis of human
rights, see McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: A Frameworkfor
Polic-Oriented Inquiry, 63 AM. J. INT'L. L. 237 (1969); McDougal, Human Rights and World
Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General Community Policies, 14 VA.
J. INT'L. L. 387 (1974). Those of the McDougal-Lasswell jurisprudential orientation use a
convenient set of eight value categories to cover the value matrix: power, well-being,
enlightenment, respect, wealth, skill, rectitude, and affection.
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into the McDougal-Lasswell methodology, they take on a significant
utility for systematic and comprehensive exploration of the context
and content of law. Moreover, in their role as references to policy
and context they perform, with other tools of the methodology,125
a most useful role in the interpretation of agreements or constitu-
tions by aiding the decision-maker in his general effort to utilize
context as a whole for the ascertaining of shared expectations and
all relevant content of the words to be interpreted.126
C. Universal Expectations
Many of these same enumerated goal-values not only are
identifiable in historic works and declarations, 27 but are also to be
found in a long history of human expectation and practice.
Further, they are compatible with developed human values and
liberties discoverable in contemporary documentations of interna-
tional human rights and expectations. 28 Indeed, the international
121 Other tools of the methodology include: five intellectual tasks-clarification of
policies, description of past trends in decision, analysis of conditions affecting past trends
and the realization or thwarting of policies, projection of future conditions, and invention
and evaluation of policy alternatives-, phase analysis for description of social interaction in
actual context-participants, perspectives, situations, resources, strategies utilized, outcomes,
long-term effects-, analysis of decision process in terms of seven "authority
functions"--intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, termination,
appraisal-, and others. See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, The Intelligence Function
and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365 (1973); sources cited in notes 16 & 124 supra.
126 See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, supra note 81.
127 See, e.g., 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 103, at 4-7; Corwin, supra note 14. Professor
Brownlie sets forth the English Bill of Rights of 1688. Even at that early date, the numerous
rights listed were considered to be "ancient" and "undoubted" rights and liberties, and they
included various formulations of a right to have governmental bodies function according to
the law and not in an "arbitrary" manner. There is also language which supports the right to
have the government function in the public interest and not to the prejudice of the people.
1. BROWNLIE, supra, at 6.
"And they do claim, demand and insist upon all and singular the premises as
their undoubted rights and liberties and that no declarations, judgments, doings or
proceedings to the prejudice of the people in any of the said premises ought in
anywise to be drawn hereafter into consequence or example.
Id.
128 The general types of rights identifiable throughout the text can be even more
extensively compared with others articulated in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1966 Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. For a presentation of these documents, see I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 103, at 106-12, 199-210, 211-31. In many cases, developed and
developing international standards are more specific. Some initial and minimal comparisons
are suggested in notes 113-21 supra. Note that where certain international instruments go
beyond the mere mapping of the boundaries and content of the rights to include specific
modes of guarantee or implementation, the courts might well conclude that they will look
only to the right, leaving such exact modes to the approval of executive and legislative
branches. Two notable exceptions will involve (1) judicial protection and (2) judicial im-
plementation where no specific mode exists, as in the cases of "the riglht to life," freedom
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rights and developed norms are in many cases more specific and
empirically demonstrable for juridical use.' 2 1 A fundamental
source of the content of present human rights law has been the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' 30 Although not
directly a part of treaty law, it has been widely accepted as binding,
as an authoritative instrument for interpretation of the United
Nations Charter, which is treaty law, and as a document which
partially evinces certain general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations and certain general content of rights that are of a
customarily international character.
An example of 'the Declaration's greater detail can be seen in
connection with the question of remedies for rights deprivations.
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration provides:
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights
granted him by the constitution or by law. 3'
Article 10 supplements this individually instigated sanctioning pro-
cess as follows:
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination
of his rights and obligations .... 132
And Article 28 adds:
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized.' 3
An international expectation of particular importance to the prior
discussion of authority and to ongoing inquiry into the calculated
interference by Mr. Nixon and others with the electoral process,
the full and free expression of the will of the people,' 34 is con-
tained in Article 21:
from "cruelty," freedom from inhumane treatment, injury, or death, the right of privacy,
and, something increasingly important, the right to adequate "food, clothing, housing and
medical care," among others. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION arts. 3, 5, 12, 25.
129 This fact, and the utility of human rights law for the interpretation of the ninth
amendment, have been recognized by at least one other current author. See Ringold, supra
note 23, at 35, 48-49. However, perhaps because he is not an international lawyer, Ringold
incorrectly stated that the 1948 Universal Declaration represents a moral consensus but not
law. Contra, Paust, supra note 103, at 1. See also J. CAREY, supra note 103, at 12-16.
130 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 6.
,3, Id. art. 8.
132 Id. art. 10.
133 Id. art. 28.
134 See pp. 240-44 & 251-52 supra.
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Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country .... The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic
and genuine elections .... 135
Since the expected right to full participation in the govern-
mental process is a human right, since all persons are entitled to an
effective remedy by a competent national tribunal and "to a full
hearing in that regard, 136 and since not only human rights are
involved in such a question but also the claimed subversion of the
authority of the people and the due process of government itself,
this type of integrated guarantee takes on a significance of far
greater import than the mere words of the fifth amendment to
the Constitution would seem to suggest. 13 7 It binds a court to
action and it takes on a significance not at all unlike the inherited
expectations found in the Declaration of Independence and the
state constitutions considered above. 38 Furthermore, when the
subversion of the authority of the people and the due process of
government is involved, that is certainly a proper time for the
exercise of judicial power. 39 The alternative is clearly expressed in
the early state constitutions, the Declaration of Independence, and
elsewhere: the reform, alteration, or abolition of government or
the less drastic response of impeachment, removal from office, and
new elections. 4 °
135 A related right of individuals in the aggregate is covered by the right of the people
to self-determination or to the free and full sharing and shaping of power. See, e.g., U.N.
CHARTER art. 1(2); G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 1; J. PAUST & A. BLAUSTEN, supra note 103;
Paust, A Survey of Possible Legal Responses to International Terrorism: Prevention, Punishment and
Cooperative Action, 5 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. - (1974); Paust, Terrorism and the International
Law of War, 64 MIL. L. REV. 1, 10, 19-20 (1974); E. Suzuki, Self-Determination and World
Public Order: Community Response to Group Formation, 1974 (unpublished J.S.D. thesis,
Yale Law School).
Article 21 is also relevant to the contemporary threat the Watergate crimes pose to the
due process of governmental elections and the free expression of the will of the people.
M36 See notes 131-32 and accompanying text supra.
137 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.... nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
138 See generally state constitutions cited note 30 supra; notes 36-38 & 58 supra.
Ma See generally United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090 (1974); Paust, supra note 9, at
17-22.
4I See note 30 and accompanying text supra. In his first inaugural address, Abraham
Lincoln voiced this alternative:
This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever
they grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional
right of amending, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it.
LINCOLN'S STORIES AND SPEECHES 212 (E. Allen ed. 1900); see note 123 supra.
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CONCLUSION
When the courts attempt to map out the full range of rights
content in connection with any matter, they should inquire into
both the domestic and the universal normative content for a more
complete identification of the boundaries and content of each type
of right. Although it is true that universal values must necessarily
be our own, there may be fundamental domestic norms which
supplement or affect the complete meaning of those rights within
our society. Furthermore, in some cases the actual content of the
developing international rights may not be sufficiently clear or
uniform so as to conclude that nation-states are in agreement on
the particularized content of a right or are much beyond a state of
rhetorical unification. 14 1 What is important, however, is that there
exists a large documentation available for judicial use which gener-
ally exceeds that of the normative values which the courts do not
hesitate to apply under notions of "due process" and "equal protec-
tion." The judicial branch no longer has an excuse for failing to
protect these rights against abuse. To preserve peace and their own
liberties, the courts must even guard against oppressions of the
people and the allowance of denials of right which can destroy the
highest form of laws and order-the rights of man and the order
of human dignity.
M" See McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public
Order, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 1 (1959); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, supra note 124, at 28.
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